




Jhering’s concept of rechTsgefühl  
and its role in The sTruggle for law
“it is the energy of our moral nature protesting against the violation of the law; 
it is the most beautiful and the highest testimony which rechtsgefühl can bear to 
itself […]”. With these words, rudolf von Jhering captured the attention of his 
audience at his Vienna lecture of The struggle for law in 872. 
the following paper is divided into three parts. i begin with a review of Jher-
ing’s concept of rechtsgefühl2. i then go on to look at its particular meaning in The 
struggle for law. finally, i show how the function of rechtsgefühl in The struggle 
for law fits into Jhering’s overall concept of rechtsgefühl.
in the late 9th and early 20th centuries, german jurisprudence was concerned 
with the phenomenology of rechtsgefühl. this concept is enigmatic. its range of 
meaning extends from an inner psychological disposition, or something that is 
given a priori, to an educated feeling for legal right, similar to legal intuition. re-
lated terms and frequently used synonyms such as rechtsbewusstsein, rechtsemp-
finden, gewissen and sittlichkeit make a clear definition difficult. 
rechtsgefühl is widely translated as “the feeling of the legal right” or “sense 
of justice”. the concept of “legal sentiment” comes closest. still, in my opinion, 
none of these is quite accurate. thus, in the following i use the term rechtsgefühl.
* Dipl.-jur., göttingen.
 r. von Jhering: The struggle for law (1872), translated from the fifth German edition by J.J. Lalor, Chicago 
879, p. 7. all (subsequent) quotations from Jhering’s lecture The struggle for law are based on J.J. lalor’s transla-
tion of 879, but i revised most of them. all remaining quotations from Jhering have been translated by myself.
2 this paper is based on research work conducted as part of my dissertation: Einzelfall, Rechtswandel und 
Fortschritt in Rudolf von Jhering’s Lehre vom Rechtsgefühl (working title).
 s. schnädelbach: The jurist as a manager of emotions, German debates on “Rechtsgefühl” in the late 19th 
and early 20th century as sites of negotiating the juristic treatment of emotions, interdisciplines 2:6 (20), 
pp. 47–48.
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I. JHERING’S CONCEPT OF rechTsgefühl
for Jhering, rechtsgefühl is a “moral feeling […], the content of the legal and 
moral truth, a historical product […] of the power of life, the practical requirement 
which has resulted in these institutions”4; finally, rechtsgefühl is “the consciousness 
of right which grows out of experience with law”. it is to rechtsgefühl that Jhering 
appeals when he calls upon everyone whose rights have been violated, and on law-
yers, in particular, to assert the importance of the legal system and of justice. this 
is the primary topic of Jhering’s lecture The struggle for law of 872.
Jhering distinguishes between rechtsgefühl as an ideal, as the critical power 
of judgement, and rechtsgefühl as the motivation for action in a practical sense, 
feeling as a subjective impulse to action6.
in his philosophy, Jhering attributes great power to the idealistic rechtsgefühl 
to bring about progress in the evolution of law. furthermore, he establishes a theo-
ry of the empirical, historical evolution of rechtsgefühl. in this, he differentiates 
between the particularization of rechtsgefühl in its application to individual legal 
cases and its generalization in terms of an evolutionary theory of law.
for Jhering, the idealistic rechtsgefühl constitutes either an inner psychologi-
cal disposition or something that is given a priori, but which also results from an 
aggregation of individual and cultural experience: “depending on the real facts that 
have been developed in history”7.
Jhering rejects the nativist theory “that nature gave human beings innate 
abilities”8. therefore, there can be no native impulse out of which rechtsgefühl 
simply grows. Moreover, natural science has proven that instincts are also variable 
and acquired by experience9.
the existing legal system, i.e. the reality of the legal institutions, generates the 
empirical basis for the development of rechtsgefühl. therefore, for Jhering, rechts-
gefühl must be a secondary phenomenon (Sekundärphänomen). “it is not rechtsgefühl 
that created law, but rather, it is law that created rechtsgefühl”0, he states in 877 
4 r. von Jhering: Über die Entstehung des Rechtsgefühles (884) (in:) o. Behrends (ed.): Rudolf von Jhering. 
Über die Entstehung des Rechtsgefühles mit einer Vorbemerkung und einem anschliessenden Interpretations- und 
Einordnungsversuch, Jovene 986, pp. 8–9.
 “das von erfahrung mit recht genährte rechtsgewissen” (in:) o. Behrend: Das “Rechtsgefühl” in der 
historisch-kritischen Rechtstheorie des späten Jhering. Ein Versuch zur Interpretation und Einordnung von Jherings 
zweitem Wiener Vortrag (in:) o. Behrends (ed.): Rudolf von Jhering. Über die Entstehung…, op. cit., p. 97.
6 r. von Jhering: Zweck im recht, Vol. 2, st ed., leipzig 88, p. 4: “gefühl [auch rechtsgefühl], welcher 
als allgemeiner Begriff gleichmässig die beiden functionen […]: die kritische (das gefühl als Urtheilskraft) und 
die praktische (das gefühl als subjectiver impuls zum handeln, als triebkraft), in sich schliesst […]”.
7 r. von Jhering: Rechtsgefühl…, op. cit., p. 9.
8 Ibidem, p. 7.
9 Ibidem, p. 28, cf. s. schnädelbach: The jurist as a manager of emotions…, op. cit., p. .
0 r. von Jhering: Zweck im recht, Vol. , st ed., leipzig 877, p. X; r. von Jhering: Entwicklungsgeschichte des 
römischen rechts, unpublished at the author’s death, V. ehrenberg (ed.), leipzig 894, p. 6.
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in his work Zweck im recht. for him, “law had to be present, before it could cast its 
reflection on the human soul”.
if rechtsgefühl is to develop, there must be a conscious and unconscious human 
capacity to abstract experiences. for a legal system to be recognized as general and 
permanent, an emotional identification of normative feelings with law must be cre-
ated through continuous experience, comparison and adaption of existing law; this 
identification must be conceptualized as normative. Like the linguistic development 
of a child, who learns over the years to abstract appropriate general terms from 
single concrete objects and to apply them to other objects of the same type, the 
development of rechtsgefühl depends on the ability to abstract general ideas from 
existing social and legal norms and to apply these gained cognitions to other cases. 
for Jhering, the experiences of prevailing social conditions are “mentally inhaled”2. 
He also uses the image of “ethical spores” that “float in the ethical air surrounding 
us” and which “the child inhales […] with his first breath” to explain the develop-
ment of rechtsgefühl.
this abstraction is both a collective and an individual process. Jhering still 
differentiates between the rechtsgefühl of specialists in law, particularly lawyers 
and scientists, and the rechtsgefühl of the general population. he attributes the 
development of law to the intuition of geniuses, “thinking minds and dynamic per-
sonalities” who are involved in the development of new principles of law; “[the 
struggle] took place on the level of science and literature”. At first, the population 
is entirely uninvolved; only once the change in law has occurred, it becomes gradu-
ally implemented in the nation’s mind, taking root in its rechtsgefühl. not until then, 
the nation’s rechtsgefühl becomes progressive4. Jhering postulates that rechtsgefühl 
“[…] is the daughter who follows her mother, reminding her of her own teachings; 
now she applies the doctrines which the mother has given her to other cases”.
Jhering states that rechtsgefühl, as the product of great minds, does not have 
the power to realize new law in the social context; legal ideals only become realized 
in law when they are combined with social forces and constellations of interests. 
this requires practical social pressure to enforce new law6.
Jhering himself was one of these great minds. as a legal consultant and mem-
ber of various Spruchfakultäten (panels of legal scholars), Jhering dealt practically 
with legal cases all his life, an experience which decisively shaped him as a profes-
sor and above all as a scientist. for Jhering, the individual case is effectively the 
catalyst for his legal thought and the decisive authority for the evolution of law. in 
 r. von Jhering: Entwicklungsgeschichte…, op. cit., p. 2.
2 Ibidem, p. 7.
 r. von Jhering: Rechtsgefühl…, op. cit., pp. 4–44.
4 r. von Jhering, Entwicklungsgeschichte…, op. cit., pp. 2–24.
 r. von Jhering: Rechtsgefühl…, op. cit., p. 0.
6 Ibidem; cf. h. schelsky: Das Jhering-Modell des sozialen Wandels durch Recht. Ein wissenschaftlicher 
Beitrag (in:) M. rehbinder, h. schelsky (ed.): Zur Effektivität des Rechts, düsseldorf 972, p. 4.
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the individual case, law addresses reality and becomes reality itself; in Jhering’s 
words: “the realization [of law] is life, and the truth of law is law itself”7. for Jhering, 
jurisprudence is “practical science”8. he postulates the primacy of practical life.
Jhering states: 
“life does not exist to serve ideas; rather, ideas exist to serve life. What must 
happen is dictated not by logic, but by life, commerce, and rechtsgefühl, regardless 
of whether it is logically necessary or logically impossible”9.
Jhering first becomes aware of the essential controlling authority of his rech-
tsgefühl in a concrete legal case: the famous schiffspartenfall, which he examined 
at the end of 88 for the Spruchfakultät of the University of gießen. “We need not 
conceal the fact that it was the protest raised by a healthy rechtsgefühl against 
a double demand for the purchase price which gave us the first impulse towards our 
legal opinion”20, Jhering wrote in 89. this case clearly demonstrates the discrep-
ancy between dogmatic deduction and real-life legal practice. Jhering also wrote to 
gerber in 89: “[the case] really tormented me and brought me to despair, until 
a light arose at the eleventh hour, and i do not believe that this was any tallow can-
dle, but a stearin light […]”2.
By this time, rechtsgefühl has become objectified in Jhering’s legal thought, 
and assumes “a key function as a methodical corrective”22. “By this acceptance of 
rechtsgefühl, the object of examination, ‘law’, has effectively been converted into 
a living thing”2. from this moment on, the term rechtsgefühl is part of legal par-
lance; there is hardly any well-known lawyer who does not have something to say 
about rechtsgefühl, although Jhering himself usually receives only cursory acknowl-
edgement. Jhering understands rechtsgefühl as a process of applied cultural and 
ethical empiricism, through which legal concepts are unconsciously abstracted 
and transferred to new legal cases, allowing new rules to arise, and ultimately, through 
social validation and consolidation, facilitating the evolution of law. for Jhering, 
7 r. von Jhering: Geist des römischen Recht auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, part 2, section 2, 
st ed., leipzig 88, p. 4.
8 r. von Jhering: Unsere Aufgabe, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Pri-
vatrechts, Vol. , 87, p. 9.
9 r. von Jhering: Geist des römischen Recht auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, part , section , 
2nd ed., leipzig 87, p. 2.
20 “Wir brauchen es nicht hehl zu haben, dass der Widerspruch, den das gesunde rechtsgefühl gegen die 
doppelte lucrierung des Kaufpreises erhebt, uns zu unserer ansicht den ersten anstoß gegeben hat!” (in:) r. von 
Jhering: Beiträge zur Lehre von der Gefahr beim Kaufcontract: Nr. 1, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen 
römischen und deutschen Privatrechts, Vol. , 89, p. 26.
2 M.g. losano: Der Briefwechsel zwischen Jhering und Gerber, Teil 1, Ebelsbach 1984 (in:) s. gagner, 
a. Kaufmann, d. nörr (eds.): Münchener Universitätsschriften. Juristische Fakulät. Abhandlungen zur rechtswis-
senschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung, Vol. /, letter to gerber 0/06/89, pp. 06–07: “[der fall] hat mich 
wahrhaft gepeinigt und zur Verzweiflung gebracht, bis mir denn noch in der 11ten Stunde ein Licht aufgegangen 
ist, und wie ich glaube kein talglicht, sondern ein stearinlicht […]”.
22 M. Kunze: Rudolf von Jhering. Ein Forschungsbericht (in:) g. Kunze, W. ogris (eds.): Der Kampf um’s 
Recht. Forschungsband aus Anlaß des 100. Todestages von Rudolf von Jhering, Berlin 99, p. 4.
2 Ibidem.
Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego 4/2017
9
rechtsgefühl is not only a diagnostic tool for finding the existing positive law, but 
a creative avant-garde which precedes the applicable law24.
therefore, we can see that rechtsgefühl plays an important role as an empirical 
reservoir of legal innovation. it merely becomes manifest through the irritation it 
produces when dealing with individual cases. in such individual cases, exemplary 
problems of today and regulatory concerns of the future are reflected.
II. ROLE OF rechTsgefühl in The sTruggle for law
“not the intellect, but the feeling, is able to answer this question; and hence 
language has rightly designated the psychological source of all law as rechtsgefühl. 
the consciousness of legal right (rechtsbewusstsein), legal conviction, are scien-
tific abstractions, with which the people are not acquainted”2, states Jhering in his 
lecture The struggle for law.
in the next part of this paper, i will examine the role of rechtsgefühl in The 
struggle for law. in his 872 lecture, Jhering postulates the (practical) rechtsgefühl 
as the motivation for action, in contrast to the idealistic rechtsgefühl described 
above. rather than the critical power of judgement, rechtsgefühl is here a subjective 
feeling of individual right. Jhering declares: “In the first sense, it is the struggle 
which accompanies the development, the formation, the progress of abstract law in 
history; in the second, it is the struggle for the realization of concrete rights”26. in 
The struggle for law, Jhering is concerned mainly with the second sense, with the 
struggle for the realization and enforcement of subjective rights.
The purpose of the lecture is “less directed at the scientific data of law than the 
courageous assertion of rechtsgefühl”27. in 884, in his work on the origin of 
rechtsgefühl, Jhering suggests that The struggle for law appeals to the “practical 
activity of rechtsgefühl, the moral and practical reaction against the disdainful 
disregard of rechtsgefühl”28. for Jhering, the struggle for law is a moral duty, and 
its driving force is rechtsgefühl29.
Jhering sees the evolution of law not as “an organic development from within 
outward”0, “the quiet working power of truth”, “a process as unnoticed and as 
24 differently (in:) M. rehbinder: Questions of the legal scholar concerning the so-called sense of justice, 
J. social Biol. struct., london 982, p. 44.
2 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., pp. 7–8.
26 r. von Jhering: Der Kampf um’s Recht (872) (in:) h. Klenner (ed.): Der Kampf um’s Recht, freiburg 992, 
p. .
27 r. von Jhering: Der Kampf um’s Recht, fourth edition, Vienna 874, p. Vii.
28 r. von Jhering: Rechtsgefühl…, op. cit., p. 9.
29 g. radbruch: Über das Rechtsgefühl (in:) a. Kaufmann (ed.): Gustav Radbruch. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 1, 
rechtsphilosophie I, heidelberg 987, pp. 424–42.
0 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., p. 8.
 Ibidem, p. 7.
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painless as is the formation and growth of language”2, but rather as a “struggle […] 
living force”, “an uninterrupted labor”4. in an attack on the historical school, he 
states: “[…] i allege that the historical school in law might just as well have been 
called the romantic. that law or the principles of legal right come into existence or 
are formed painlessly, without trouble, without action, like the vegetable creation, 
is a really romantic notion, that is, a notion based on a false idealization of past 
conditions”. according to Jhering, rechtsgefühl carries with it an imperative to 
actively form law. law is only able to grow in society “if it [is] taken seriously as 
a guide for individual action”6. But for Jhering, “the interest of this struggle is not 
confined, by any means, to private life or private law. Rather does it extend far be-
yond them. a nation is, after all, only the sum of all the individuals who compose 
it, and the nation thinks, feels and acts the same way as its individuals think, feel 
and act”7.
hence, while Jhering wishes, above all, to point out that rechtsgefühl is fun-
damentally essential to the assertion of the legal rights of the individual citizen, he 
emphasizes that it is no less relevant to the nation: “in the healthy, vigorous rechts-
gefühl of the individual, the state possesses the most fruitful source of its own strength, 
the surest guarantee, from within and from without, of its own existence. rechtsge-
fühl is the root of the whole tree […]”8.
in a famous passage, Jhering also asserts: “irritability, that is the capacity to 
feel pain at the violation of one’s legal rights, and action, that is the courage and 
the determination to repel the attack, are, in my eyes, the two criteria of a healthy 
rechtsgefühl”9.
Jhering continually refers to paradigms from the natural sciences; for example, 
his metaphor of rechtsgefühl as an organic attribute: rechtsgefühl as “moral pain”40, 
a kind of physical acquisition of knowledge, allowing it to act as a surrogate for 
cognitive ability4.
“[W]hat do the people know of the right of property, of contract as a moral 
condition of the existence of the person? Know? they may know nothing about it, 
but whether they do not feel it is another question; and i hope that i shall be able to 
show that such is the case. What do people know of kidneys, lungs, liver as condi-
tions of their physical life? But everyone feels the stitch in the lungs, or a pain in 
the kidneys or liver, and understands the warning which it conveys to him. physical 
2 Ibidem.
 Ibidem, p. .
4 Ibidem, p. 2.
 Ibidem, p. .
6 s. schnädelbach: The jurist as a manager of emotions…, op. cit., p. .
7 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., p. 9.
8 Ibidem, pp. 96–97.
9 Ibidem, p. 9.
40 Ibidem, p. 26.
4 s. schnädelbach: The jurist as a manager of emotions…, op. cit., p. 4.
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pain is the signal of a disturbance in the organism, of the presence of an influence 
inimical to it. […] the very same is true of the moral pain caused us by intentional 
injustice, by arbitrariness”42.
Jhering postulates a “pathology of rechtsgefühl”4. he uses such terms as 
“healthy” and “vigorous” vs. “blunted” and “apathetic” to describe rechtsgefühl44. 
for him, law, legal right, threatens to become blunted, withered and decayed if hu-
man action is absent: “What the air is to the flame, freedom of action is to rechts-
gefühl. refuse it this freedom, and the feeling dies”4.
Jhering also uses the terms “rechtsgefühl”, “personality”, “person” and “char-
acter” as if they were synonyms46. thus, rechtsgefühl can be characterized as 
highly subjective. Jhering impressively states: “an inner voice tells him that he 
should not retreat, that it is not the worthless object that is at stake but his rechts-
gefühl, his self-respect, his own personality […] [it is] a question of character”47.
Jhering assumes that people are enraged by different types of violation of rights, 
every individual defending the basic moral conditions of his own existence. the 
peasant defends his property, the officer his honour, the merchant his credit48. thus 
our notion of law is influenced by social and cultural forces; they determine which 
infringements must be disputed. “if different classes respond to different slights, 
there must be a consensus on the core values of all the citizens if a coherent body 
politic is to evolve”49.
according to Jhering, the power of rechtsgefühl is equally strong in every 
single individual. Jhering declares: 
“the manner in which the wounded feeling of law or of personality reacts, 
whether under the influence of passion in wild and violent action, or with subdued, 
persistent resistance, is no measure of the intensity of the strength of rechtsgefühl; 
and there can be no greater error than to ascribe to the savage or the uncultured man, 
with whom the former manner is the normal one, a stronger rechtsgefühl than to 
the educated man who takes the second course. this manner is more or less a matter 
of education and temperament […]”0.
The struggle for law was inspired, amongst other things, by Kleist’s michael 
Kohlhaas. Jhering cherished Kohlhaas as “a martyr to his rechtsgefühl”. in Kleist’s 
42 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., pp. 8–9.
4 Ibidem, p. 6.
44 Ibidem, pp. 96, 9.
4 Ibidem, p. 0.
46 particularly in r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., pp. 2, 6, 9.
47 Ibidem, p. 26.
48 Ibidem, p. 42; cf. W. seagle: Rudolf von Jhering: or Law as a means to an end, the University of chicago 
law review, Vol. , no.  (dec., 94), p. 82.
49 J.M. Mclaughin: The Unification of Germany: What would Jhering say?, fordham international law Jour-
nal, Vol. 7, issue 2, 99, p. 28.
0 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., pp. 60–6.
 Ibidem, p. 87.
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novella, Kohlhaas, a decent man who is cheated by a nobleman out of two horses, 
restores justice by breaking the law. the violation of his right awakens Kohlhaas to 
his own rechtsgefühl. he takes its defence in his own hands, his rechtsgefühl be-
coming absolutized; there is no inhibition or self-restraint. it is true that Kohlhaas 
has indeed been wronged, but the unconditionality of his rechtsgefühl leads to in-
justice and inhumanity. in the end, Kohlhaas wins justice, but at the price of his own 
execution which he willingly accepts2.
the quintessential meaning which Jhering draws from Kleist’s novella is that 
rechtsgefühl and self-interest are not consubstantial; rechtsgefühl can prevail over 
self-interest. Jhering declares: “it is not a mere money-interest which urges the 
person whose rights have been infringed to institute legal proceedings, but moral 
pain provoked by the wrong which has been endured”4. for Jhering, in lawsuits “in 
which the disproportion […] exists between the value of the object in controversy and 
the prospective cost”, the person’s assertion of his rechtsgefühl is more important 
than the insignificant object of dispute6. the case of Kohlhaas also shows that when 
an individual’s rights are violated, he has to seek justice7. Jhering (following Kleist) 
liked to say: “Better be a dog, if i am to be trodden under foot, than a man”8.
Jhering states: 
“the struggle for his right is a duty of the person whose rights have been vio-
lated to himself. the preservation of existence is the highest law of the whole living 
creation. it manifests itself in every creature in the instinct of self-preservation. now 
man is not concerned only with his physical life but with his whole moral existence. 
But the condition of this moral existence is right, in the law”9.
the power of the subjective, highly emotional, passionate feeling becomes 
particularly clear in Jhering’s legal dispute with his maidservant60. he shows, based 
on his own litigation, that rationality often loses out to the emotions. Jhering uses 
rechtsgefühl “to refer to violations of what one feels to be right, irrespective of 
whether law agrees with the feeling”6. consequently, Jhering asserts that “the strug-
gle for law, the battle for one’s legal rights, is the poetry of character”62.
2 h. von Kleist: The Marquise of O and other Stories, translated by d. luke, n. reeves, harmondsworth 978, 
pp. 4–2; cf. n. duxbury: Jhering’s Philosophy of Authority, oxford Journal of legal studies, Vol. 27, no.  
(2007), pp. 44–4.
 n. duxbury: Jhering’s Philosophy…, op. cit., p. 4.
4 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., p. 26.
 Ibidem, p. 2.
6 Ibidem, pp. 2–26.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem, p. 29.
9 Ibidem.
60 “da habe ich aber, kann ich sagen, gefühlt diesen stachel des erlittenen Unrechts, wenn man sein gutes recht 
hat und die einrichtungen des staates derartige sind (‚Bravo!), daß man mit dem besten Willen sein recht nicht 
geltend machen, nicht durchsetzen kann” (in:) r. von Jhering: Der Kampf… (872), p. 28–29.
6 n. duxbury: Jhering’s Philosophy…, op. cit., p. 46.
62 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit., p. 6.
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III. CLASSIFICATION — The sTruggle for law  
in Jhering‘s concept of rechTsgefühl
this leads me to the next point, that is the way in which the rechtsgefühl de-
scribed by Jhering in The struggle for law fits into his overall concept of rechts-
gefühl.
in The struggle for law, Jhering chooses very individual and emotionally 
motivated cases to demonstrate the great significance of the practical function of 
rechtsgefühl as the motivation to act. later, particularly in 884 in on the origin 
of rechtsgefühl, Jhering postulates the moral nature of rechtsgefühl. directly alive, 
natural and instinctive in the reaction to a violation of right, it ultimately becomes 
the consciousness that drives the historical evolution of law, adapting it to the 
moral order of its time and its people. thus, rechtsgefühl in The struggle for law 
ultimately becomes part of the concept of rechtsgefühl described in the first part of 
this paper.
in the end, Jhering’s rechtsgefühl, objectivized and adjusted by personal and 
emotional evaluation, becomes the “pioneer of progress”6. Jhering’s study of re-
chtsgefühl culminates in his Zweck im recht of 877/88, translated as law as 
a means to an end, and in his essay on the origin of rechtsgefühl of 884. in the 
context of the developmental philosophy of roman law which he plans to publish, 
Jhering pursues the introduction of a pragmatic jurisprudence which practises an 
evolutionary combination of law and morality. for Jhering, the purpose is the supreme 
aspect of morality, and thus the basis of meaningful legal principle. in the authority 
of rechtsgefühl, Jhering recognizes both the guarantee of equilibrium in law (justice) 
and the guarantee of legal protection. a person is unerringly guided by his growing 
experience of justice, which is reflected in the critical values of his rechtsgefühl, 
towards a more appropriate legal structure.
in Zweck im recht, Jhering makes a remarkable return to the primacy of objec-
tive morality. Ultimately, the objective moral order is the source of the subjective 
moral feeling, which is “not the historical prius, but the posterius of the real world 
created by the practical purpose”64.
for Jhering, rechtsgefühl “has the irreplaceable function of making the law 
reality”6.
he writes: 
“not the intellect, but the feeling, is able to answer this question […] but as 
love frequently does not know itself, and as a single instant suffices to bring it to 
a full consciousness of itself, so rechtsgefühl uniformly knows not what it is; but 
6 r. von Jhering: Rechtsgefühl…, op. cit., p. 0.
64 r. von Jhering: Zweck im Recht…, Vol. 2, p. X.
6 s. schnädelbach: The jurist as a manager of emotions…, op. cit., p. .
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the violation of legal right compels it to speak, unveils the truth, and manifests its 
force”66.
thus, Jhering postulates an evolutionary theory of law, expressed with par-
ticular clarity in the following citation from his lecture The struggle for law:
“the law is the saturn who is devouring its own children; the law can renew 
its youth only by breaking with its own past. a concrete legal right or principle of 
law, which, simply because it has come into existence, claims an unlimited and 
therefore eternal existence, is the child lifting its arm against its own mother; it 
despises the idea of the law when it appeals to that idea; for the idea of the law is an 
eternal Becoming; but that which has become must yield to the new Becoming, since 
‘everything which is created must also pass away!’ and thus, the historical develop-
ment of law presents us with a picture of research, struggle, fight, in short of toilsome, 
wearying endeavor”67.
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Jhering’s concept of rechTsgefühl  
and its role in The sTruggle for law
s u m m a r y
the paper examines the doctrine of “rechtsgefühl” as developed by the famous pan-
dectist and legal empiricist rudolf von Jhering. the iridescent concept of rechtsgefühl 
is discussed extensively and impressively in the literature, but Jhering’s key contribution 
usually receives only cursory mention. This paper is intended to show the great significance 
of Jhering’s rechtsgefühl, particularly its role in his lecture The struggle for law. rechts-
gefühl, as Jhering conceives it, combines a practical consideration of individual cases, 
a reflection of the purposes of law and the experience of the observer. It is the essence of 
what Jhering understands by living legal doctrine and the progress of law.
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